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Abstract
In theory, candidate debates can influence voters by providing information about candidates’ quality
and policy positions. However, there is limited evidence about whether and why debates influence
voters in new democracies. We use a field experiment on parliamentary debates during Ghana’s 2016
elections to show that debates improve voters’ evaluations of candidates. Debates have the strongest
effect on partisan voters, who become more favorable toward and more likely to vote for opponent-
party candidates and less likely to vote for co-partisans. Experimental and unique observational data
capturing participants’ second-by-second reactions to the debates show that policy information was
the most important causal mechanism driving partisan moderation, especially among strong partisans.
A follow-up survey shows that these effects persist in electorally competitive communities, while
they dissipate in party strongholds. Policy-centered debates have the potential to reduce partisan
polarization in new democracies, but the local political context conditions the persistence of these
effects.
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses
in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard
Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OJA7YS.
Word Count: 9,964
Candidate debates are an increasingly prevalent aspect of electoral campaigns around the world.1
Yet we lack evidence on how they influence voters in new democracies. On the one hand, debates could
help citizens choose representatives based on their qualifications or policy positions, which may enhance
accountability (Besley, 2006). Alternatively, debates could reinforce ethnic voting or encourage voters to
evaluate politicians on the basis of their appearance (Lawson et al., 2010). Further, it is unknown whether,
in the context of newer democracies, debates moderate partisan opinions or polarize the electorate by
entrenching the preferences of partisan voters (Levendusky, 2013).
To address the fundamental questions of whether and why debates influence voters, we conducted
a field experiment analyzing the impact of parliamentary debates held ahead of Ghana’s 2016 elections.2
The debates, organized by Ghana’s National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the Center
for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), included all of the parliamentary candidates competing in
the constituencies where we conducted the research.3 The debates were real locally organized campaign
events, which enhances the external validity of the study. Candidates were in the same location, answered
the same questions, and engaged with their competitors; in short, they were similar to debates held in
older democracies, including the United States. We videotaped the debates in three electoral constituen-
cies and randomly assigned study participants (N=1,991) to view either the debate or a control video;
we surveyed them immediately afterward. To determine whether the effects of the debate persisted, we
conducted a follow-up survey two days later with a randomly selected subsample.
We argue that debates could influence voters through two theoretical channels: information about
candidates’ quality and information about candidates’ policy positions. To assess these causal mecha-
nisms, the debates were organized into a personal background segment, in which candidates did not
discuss policies but could convey information about their quality, and a policy segment, in which candi-
dates discussed education and unemployment policy. We randomly assigned participants to view either
only the personal background segment, only the policy segment, or the whole debate. To assess the
importance of physical attributes, which could be interpreted as a signal of candidate quality (Lawson
1Debates are conducted in over 60 countries, including Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Iraq,
Peru, Sierra Leone, and the USA (National Democratic Institute, 2014).
2Our hypotheses, measurement strategies, and analyses were pre-specified in a pre-analysis plan. Table A in the Appendix
(pg. 1) details all pre-specified hypotheses and associated results.
3The NCCE is a constitutionally mandated, non-partisan institution, and CDD-Ghana is a non-governmental organization.
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et al., 2010), we also randomly assigned some participants to watch the debates and others to listen to
them. By comparing the effects of these separate treatment arms, we can make inferences about causal
mechanisms. Further, to gain an in-depth understanding of how debates can shape voter attitudes, we
also collected unique observational data that captures participants’ real-time, second-by-second positive
and negative reactions to the debates. Using these data, we identify the specific moments that generated
reactions from participants.
We show that debates do influence voters — by improving their evaluations of candidates. The
experimental data suggests that this effect is driven by information about both candidates’ personal qual-
ities and their policy positions. We find no evidence that physical attributes or visual cues are important.
We further show that debates have the largest impact on partisans and no average effect on swing
voters. Rather than entrenching their pre-existing preferences, the debates made partisan voters more
favorable to opposition politicians and less likely to want to vote for their party’s candidate. In short,
the debates moderated political attitudes. Regarding the causal mechanisms driving the moderation
effect, the experimental evidence demonstrates that policy-centered information is of greater importance
than information on quality, particularly among the most strongly committed partisans. Consistent with
this, the real-time response data shows that partisans were highly polarized in their reactions to the
personal background segment — providing positive reactions to co-partisans and negative reactions to
other candidates. In the policy segments, this partisan polarization decreased substantially.
Finally, we show that the moderation effect persisted among partisans who live in electorally
competitive communities; the effect dissipates among those who live in politically homogeneous com-
munities. This finding highlights that while debates may promote political moderation in the short term,
the political context of a voter’s local community conditions the durability of the effect.
With these results, we make three novel contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on
how partisan identities shape voter responsiveness to political information (Taber and Lodge, 2006). The
American politics literature suggests that swing voters and those with weak partisan attachments are more
likely to be influenced by debates (Geer, 1988; Hillygus and Jackman, 2003). However, prior research
on debates in new democracies has been unable to detect differences between swing and partisan voters.4
4Bidwell, Casey and Glennerster (2016) was statistically underpowered to detect differences in effects between swing and
partisan voters.
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Our finding that debates moderated the attitudes of strong partisans implies that debates may have differ-
ent effects in older versus newer democracies. We suggest two related explanations for this result. First,
because partisans hold strong negative prior evaluations of their opponent-party candidates, debates may
provide surprising and convincing policy information that can encourage moderation, consistent with a
model of Bayesian information processing. Second, because partisanship in newer democracies is of-
ten not ideologically anchored and more fluid, voters may not engage in partisan motivated reasoning
when evaluating the information debates convey. Thus, partisans in these contexts may be open to new
information about opposition candidates, especially information about policy positions.
Second, our focus on causal mechanisms advances the literature on candidate debates and
candidate-centered events in developing countries. Consistent with other studies, we show that these
types of campaign events can impact voter preferences (Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Wantchekon
et al., 2017; Bidwell, Casey and Glennerster, 2016; Platas and Raffler, 2018). We advance this literature
with experimental and unique observational data that speaks to why debates impact voters. Understand-
ing causal mechanisms is important because of their theoretical and normative implications for the role
of debates in democratic elections.5
Finally, the study contributes to the literature on candidate messages and voter behavior in new
democracies (Cruz et al., 2018). Existing research suggests that political parties in sub-Saharan Africa
tend to rely on valence appeals to attract votes (Bleck and Van de Walle, 2013; Lupu and Riedl, 2013)
— non-contentious policies such as a commitment to improving living standards. By contrast, we show
that debates motivate parliamentary aspirants to stake out distinct positions concerning how they plan
to achieve developmental goals in their constituencies. Importantly, we provide evidence that voters are
responsive to policy-specific campaign appeals.
5Bidwell, Casey and Glennerster (2016) also attempt to distinguish the policy mechanism from personal background
mechanism. They do so by presenting participants with news reports that discuss the policy contents of the debates and “get
to know you” videos that focus on the candidates’ personal attributes. This design simultaneously alters the content and the
delivery format. In comparison, we hold the debate format constant and change only the content in order to determine whether
differences in content drive differences in effects.
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1 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
The theoretical literature on political accountability highlights that voters often judge political candidates
along two dimensions: their policy positions and their quality (Besley, 2006). Voters in many new
democracies struggle to access credible information about candidates along these dimensions (Pande,
2011), which can make it difficult for voters to hold leaders accountable and select better representatives.
Candidate debates are campaign events that, in principle, can give voters access to information
about both candidate quality and policy positions. They do so in a way that is distinct from other types
of campaign events, such as campaign rallies. For example, the structure of debates forces candidates to
discuss similar topics under the same time constraints, which allows voters to directly compare candi-
dates. Debates also allow candidates to directly engage with their opponents’ arguments and positions,
which exposes voters to competing arguments and justifications for different policy positions. Since
voters in many new democracies lack access to the types of information about candidates that debates
convey, we expect that, on average, debates have a positive effect on voters’ evaluations of candidates
who participate in them (H1).6
1.1 Why Do Debates Influence Voters?
Debates may influence voters through two distinct, though not mutually exclusive, causal channels: infor-
mation about candidate quality and information about candidates’ policy positions. While policy refers
to specific positions, goals, and plans, quality refers to characteristics associated with the candidate’s
ability to achieve these goals.
Regarding quality, candidates can use debates to convey a range of information about themselves,
including their level of education, moral character, and capacity as a leader. In the context of legislative
elections, this information can enable voters to determine how successfully candidates can accomplish
the main tasks of legislators: to legislate and represent constituency needs, to oversee the executive, and
to deliver constituency service (Lindberg, 2010). Knowledge of these individual qualities can help voters
evaluate how well legislators will do at implementing important tasks such as providing or lobbying the
6To be consistent with past studies, we also hypothesized that debates would have a bigger impact for candidates who
performed well, and for minor and opposition party candidates. We present these results in Appendix H (pg. 17).
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government for local public infrastructure, raising the plight of constituents on the floor of parliament,
and holding the government to account. Because debates can provide this information, we hypothesize
that debates influence voters because they provide information about candidates’ quality, such as their
qualifications, competence, and trustworthiness (H2).
In addition, debates could influence voters through non-verbal (visual) signals and forms of com-
munication. For instance, some candidates may be more physically attractive or visually charismatic,
which voters may implicitly (and often incorrectly) interpret as a signal of candidate quality (Lawson
et al., 2010). We thus test the hypothesis that debates influence voters because of non-verbal signals and
communication (H3).
Debates also provide a forum for candidates to outline their policy positions. The African pol-
itics literature highlights that political parties and candidates often prefer to communicate their policy
messages through valence appeals; that is, by couching their messages in terms that almost no one could
disagree with, for example by “[saying] they are for something good (like development, education, demo-
cratic practices) or against something bad (like corruption or colonial interference)” (Bleck and Van de
Walle, 2013, 1414).
However, because valence appeals can make it hard for voters to differentiate between candidates
on programmatic grounds, debates may incentivize candidates to stake out specific policy positions to
distinguish themselves from their competitors. Voters in new democracies may be particularly receptive
to policies that promote the provision of local public goods, for example, schools, and health clinics
(Lindberg, 2010). In the debates that we study, although candidates did make valence appeals, they also
tried to draw policy distinctions from one another by making specific policy promises. For example, both
major parties made the valence appeal of promising to expand access to secondary education. However,
the debates revealed real differences in the two parties’ policy plans for achieving this objective: one
advocated investments in infrastructure and the other a plan to eliminate secondary school fees. We
thus test the hypothesis that debates influence voters because they provide information about candidates’
policy positions (H4).
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1.2 Which Types of Voters Are Influenced by Debates?
Prior literature suggests that the strength of voters’ prior partisanship is likely to condition the impact of
debates. For example, independent and undecided voters may be more likely than partisans to be influ-
enced by campaign events, including debates (Geer, 1988; Hillygus and Jackman, 2003). There is also
evidence that swing voters in some African contexts are more influenced by policy-related information
(Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013) and are more likely to change their vote intention during the course of a
campaign (Horowitz, 2017). Thus, debates should have the greatest positive effect when swing and weak
partisan voters evaluate candidates who have performed well in the debates (H5).
By contrast, partisans may be likely to interpret debates in a manner that reinforces their prior
political opinions (Geer, 1988) or to discard information from the debate that is inconsistent with their
partisan views (Taber and Lodge, 2006). These expectations build upon dual-process models of infor-
mation processing (Rahn, 1993) and theories of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). According to the
former, individuals process information through two processes: a heuristic process, in which individuals
rely upon simple cues, and a systematic process, which involves conscious deliberation and evaluation
(Rahn, 1993). Given that systematic processing requires more effort, partisan voters may rely on partisan
heuristics when evaluating candidates in the debates (Rahn, 1993). Moreover, information processing is
often guided by a desire to affirm partisan or social identity (Kunda, 1990). If partisan voters privilege
such goals over accuracy, they will be motivated to scrutinize and evaluate new information in a way
that reinforces, or even amplifies, prior beliefs (Taber and Lodge, 2006). Consequently, among strong
partisans, debates may have a greater impact on support for the voter’s co-partisan (H6).7
H5 and H6 capture our ex ante (pre-specified) expectations. However, there are several reasons
why debates could also moderate partisan voters’ political preferences. First, an alternative model of in-
formation processing holds that voters update their beliefs following Bayes’ Rule (Bullock, 2009; Gerber
and Green, 1999). Consistent with this, there is evidence that voters can accurately update their beliefs in
light of policy information, even when that information is accompanied by party cues or is inconsistent
with partisan priors (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Bullock, 2011). Although Bayesian learning can
7We also pre-specified hypotheses about how the impact of debates may be conditioned by political knowledge and how
debates may influence attitudes towards tolerance, vote buying and electoral integrity. Appendix N (pg. 29) displays these
results.
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be consistent with partisan disagreement (Bullock, 2009; Gerber and Green, 1999), in many contexts it
is likely to generate partisan moderation. This is because Bayes’ Rule implies that information is most
likely to influence voters when it differs from their prior beliefs — when it is new or surprising (Dun-
ning et al., Forthcoming). Since committed partisans are likely to have very negative prior beliefs about
candidates from other parties, debates can provide new information to partisans about these candidates
that is positive relative to their negative priors. Conversely, debates can provide partisans new informa-
tion about co-partisans that generates disappointment given their strong positive priors. For example,
partisans may be surprised about how well qualified opponents are or, equally, disappointed that their
co-partisan’s policy proposals are not as convincing as they originally believed. Together, these effects
produce moderation; partisan voters’ attitudes toward candidates become less polarized.
Second, partisan motivated reasoning may be less likely in new democracies compared to older
ones because political parties are younger and often do not develop strong ideological platforms or dif-
ferentiate on policy grounds (Van De Walle and Butler, 1999). Given this, voters may be more responsive
to new information than they might be in contexts where partisanship is more clearly structured along
ideological lines and partisan identities are stronger. Put simply, voters may not be motivated to privilege
partisan goals over accuracy goals when processing new information.8 Thus, by providing information
about candidate quality and policy positions, debates may provide new information about opposing party
candidates that partisan voters find convincing.
Finally, the structure of debates – which simultaneously exposes voters to competing political
perspectives – can prompt voters to better understand the rationales behind the perspectives of competi-
tors, which can promote moderation (Mutz, 2002). Information provided by opposition candidates may
be especially influential in newer democracies because voters may not be aware of the arguments of all
parties. Thus, given their unique structure, the effect of debates may be distinct from other types of
campaign events and forms of political information.
8Voters may be motivated to affirm other social identities, such as ethnicity, when processing new information (Adida
et al., 2017). In the context of parliamentary debates in Ghana, ethnic and regional identities are usually constant across all
candidates.
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2 Parliamentary Elections and Debates in Ghana
We conduct our study around the parliamentary elections held in Ghana in December 2016, the seventh
since the return to democracy in 1992. One Member of Parliament (MP) serves each of the country’s
275 political constituencies for a four-year term. The parliament is often composed only of MPs from
the two major political parties — the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party
(NPP). The prominent minor parties are the Convention People’s Party (CPP), the People’s Progressive
Party (PPP), and the People’s National Convention (PNC). Although candidates from the minor parties
usually fail to get elected, these parties receive about 5 percent of votes nationally.
While election campaigns in Ghana often involve clientelistic exchanges (Nathan, 2019), there is
also evidence that voters consider policy issues and public service provision (Harding, 2015; Weghorst
and Lindberg, 2013). Civil society organizations are increasingly coordinating programs designed to
promote policy-based campaigning and to provide opportunities for voters to gather information about
parliamentary candidates. CDD-Ghana began holding parliamentary debates during the 2012 election
campaign. These debates are modeled on the televised presidential debates that have been held since
2000.
3 The Debates
CDD-Ghana and the NCCE organized parliamentary debates in 50 constituencies across Ghana’s 10
regions during the 2016 elections. We conducted our study in three: Effutu, Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-
Abirem (KEEA), and Mfantseman in the Central Region (See Figure 1). We selected these constituencies
because they are a microcosm of Ghana’s partisan landscape; each comprises communities that strongly
support either the NDC or the NPP, as well as communities that are competitive. The Central region is
also home to swing voters. Thus, while these constituencies are more electorally competitive than the
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average constituency in Ghana,9 they are ideal locations to test hypotheses about the effect of debates on
partisan and swing voters.10
Table 1 displays the candidates’ names and party affiliations. The debates were held in public
locations and were attended by ordinary voters as well as party members, traditional authorities, and
leaders of community organizations. The debates were broadcast on local radio stations and were covered
in local newspapers. We videotaped the debates and then transferred the videos to smartphones to show
study participants.
Figure 1 about here
Candidates spoke in the language of their choice. While most spoke exclusively in Fante (the
dominant language in the Central Region), some spoke partly in English.11 Each debate had an identical
structure. Candidates were in the same location and on the same stage when answering the moderator’s
questions, and often engaged with the statements of the other candidates. This study focuses on two
of the three main debate segments. First, each candidate had two minutes to describe their personal
background, qualifications, and values. We refer to this as the Personal Background segment. Second,
the moderator asked each candidate to discuss their plans in two policy areas: education (2 minutes) and
unemployment (2 minutes). We refer to this as the Policy segment.12
Table 1 about here
3.1 Personal Background Segment
In this segment, candidates discussed three broad topics: their familial heritage, their motivation to enter
politics, and their qualifications. Most sought to establish their familial connections to local communities.
For example, Ato Arthur (NPP), emphasized his roots in the constituency, stating that he is “a proud
9During the prior election (2012), the average margin of victory in parliamentary races in Central was 11 percentage
points. This figure is comparable to other competitive regions in the country. The Central region is also typical in terms of
the parliamentary vote share of minor parties: about four percent compared to an average of six percent across the other nine
regions.
10 In Appendix B we present results from a constituency-level analysis (pgs. 2-5). As debates were not randomly assigned
to constituencies, these analyses are observational and should be interpreted with caution. Results suggest that debates have
a negative association with incumbent vote share and a positive association with minor party vote share. Neither of these
relationships are statistically significant.
11The study used only the candidates’ original language; no translations were provided to participants.
12Candidates also fielded questions from audience members. To ensure uniform treatment across constituencies, our ex-
periment did not include these discussions.
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son of Komenda; my mother and my father are from Abram-Boase, the former chief family head.”
Quandoh Okyere (PPP) noted that “[he] was born in Mankessim, [his] mother is from Mankessim-Twafo,
[his] father was also born in Mankessim and so when they are talking about the indigenous people of
Mankessim [he is] also part of them.”
Many also articulated why they got involved in politics. The NPP candidate in Effutu, and in-
cumbent in the district, Alex Afenyoh-Markin said: “Nobody introduced me to politics, I started politics
on my own because growing up I saw the hardships we face here in Winneba, I see what poverty has
done to people and so I promised myself that if God saves me from poverty, I will also come and save
my people. That is why I joined politics.”
All candidates detailed their academic qualifications and their professional experience. To
demonstrate their commitment to local issues, most highlighted their involvement in local organizations
or their past work to help the community.
3.2 Policy Segment
The policy segment focused on two salient issues in the 2016 campaign: education and unemployment.
The candidates employed a mix of valence and policy-specific discourse during these segments. Regard-
ing valence, one CPP candidate said, “When the CPP comes into power, the constant power instability
will be a thing of the past . . . the light problem is fixed: we will work and be comfortable." Another
candidate said, “There will be a new era for entrepreneurship in Effutu. We will encourage entrepreneurs
to establish their businesses in Winneba."
Most candidates also proposed specific policy plans (summarized in Table 2). For example, the
NDC and NPP candidates offered distinct policies to improve access to secondary education. The NPP
candidates, along with candidates from the CPP and PPP, promised to eliminate school fees for secondary
school. For example, Ato Arthur (NPP, KEEA) argued that “the paramount reason why the children
are unable to complete is the hardship that the parents face to pay for their school fees.” By contrast,
the NDC candidates emphasized their commitment to infrastructure development as a way to increase
public access to secondary school. NDC candidates also challenged the NPP’s proposal for universal
free secondary school. For example, the NDC candidate in KEEA responded to the NPP candidate’s
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education proposal by asking “if any government comes here to say that SHS [secondary school] is free,
what school is here for the children to go to?”
Regarding employment policies, several candidates discussed the importance of providing skills
training for young people. Others emphasized the need to re-open specific local factories to process
poultry and locally grown cassava. Many candidates also highlighted their plans to support the fishing
industry by constructing a new harbor.
Table 2 about here
4 Research Design
We designed the study to experimentally test hypotheses about why debates influence voters’ attitudes. To
test our hypotheses about causal mechanisms, we employ implicit mediation analysis (Gerber and Green,
2012). The design entails randomly assigning participants to different components of the treatment –
in our case, different segments of debates – which correspond to different potential causal channels.
Comparing the causal effect of each segment allows us to identify which mechanism (or mechanisms) is
responsible for the treatment effects that we identify. This approach avoids concerns about the potential
bias involved in using intermediate variables to assess mechanisms (Gerber and Green, 2012; Imai et al.,
2011).
Randomization was at the individual level. In one treatment condition, participants watched only
the personal background segment; they learned about candidate quality, but not policy positions. In an-
other treatment condition, participants only viewed the policy segment. In another condition, participants
watched both segments. In the final condition, participants listened to both segments. Participants in the
control group watched a non-political, placebo video that was roughly equal in length to the debate.13
Figure 2 displays the five treatment conditions and the number of respondents in each.
Our design permits experimental inferences about causal mechanisms. For example, if the policy
segment has a larger impact than the personal background segment, this would provide evidence that
policy-centered discussions are an important mechanism, as those in the personal background segment
do not learn about policy positions. Alternatively, if the full debate video condition has a larger effect than
13The video was an extract from a show by a popular Ghanaian comedian.
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the full debate audio condition, this would suggest that visual information is important. We also note that
candidates may convey quality during the policy segments. Thus, our design focuses on distinguishing
the impact of policy-centered discussion from direct information about candidate quality that is conveyed
during the personal background segment.
Figure 2 about here
As noted, the debates that we analyze were real campaign events. Accordingly, some respon-
dents in our sample had heard about or seen them before we contacted them. About fifteen percent of
respondents had pre-treatment exposure to the debates. Importantly for our analyses, these respondents
are distributed equally across the control and treatment groups (see Appendix Tables D.1 and D.2, pgs.
7-8). Our results are also robust to excluding respondents who had prior exposure to the debates.14
4.1 Sampling and Interview Procedure
Our sampling procedure was guided by our goal to determine how partisanship conditions the impact
of debates on voters. To ensure that the sample contained partisans of both major parties, as well as
swing voters, we first stratified Electoral Areas (EAs) within each constituency.15 We classify EAs as
being NPP strongholds, NDC strongholds or electorally competitive.16 We then randomly selected re-
spondents from EAs within each of these three blocks. Appendix Tables D.1 and D.2 present descriptive
information about the sample, including covariate balance across treatment and control groups.
After completing a short survey, participants watched (or listened to) the debate (or placebo
video) associated with their treatment condition. Respondents viewed the debate on a smartphone.17
Enumerators gave the participant as much privacy as possible.
4.2 Main Outcome Measures
Our main outcome measures were collected through a survey conducted immediately after each partici-
pant viewed the debate (or control video). The first dependent variable is a continuous measure, ranging
14Relatedly, our design rules out the possibility that spillover effects within or across constituency boundaries will bias our
results because outcome measures were collected immediately after our individual-level treatment.
15EAs are sub-constituency units.
16See Appendix C for further details on EA classification and sampling (pg. 6).
17A random number generator in the survey program assigned participants to one of the five conditions.
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from one to seven, of the participant’s overall evaluation of each candidate in the debate: [What is] your
overall assessment of [candidate name], who is the [political party name] candidate for parliament in
[constituency name]. We also create a binary measure using the same question (positive evaluation),
which takes a value of 1 if the overall evaluation is greater than 4 (a positive rating), and 0 otherwise.18
We also analyze a dichotomous (0/1) measure of vote choice. To limit response bias, the smart-
phone displayed logos and labels for each participating political party. Participants then privately se-
lected which party’s candidate they would vote for by tapping on the party logo. The exact wording
of the prompt was: Please click on the party that you would vote for if the upcoming parliamentary
elections were held today in [constituency name].
These outcome measures capture distinct but related outcomes. The evaluation measures capture
whether debates lead voters to alter their assessments of candidates. The vote choice outcome assesses
whether debates impact intended voting behavior. We emphasize that whether and how debates change
citizens’ evaluations of candidates is important even if debates do not change intended vote choice.
For example, in polarized political contexts it is important to understand whether debates reduce — or
increase — partisan bias in voters’ evaluation of candidates, as this can have implications for partisan
polarization and political stability.
4.3 Coding Partisans and Swing Voters
To measure partisanship, we use pre-treatment survey questions similar to “feeling thermometers.”19 To
construct the partisan thermometer, we asked participants (pre-treatment) to rate, on a 1–7 scale, how
close they feel to each of the major parties. We added these evaluations to produce a continuous scale.
Voters with larger negative scores are closer to the NDC, and higher positive scores closer to the NPP.
As pre-specified, we coded voters by cutting the distribution of this continuous variable at the 33rd and
66th percentiles, such that the bottom third of the distribution are NDC partisans, the top third of the
distribution are NPP partisans, and the middle third are swing voters.
18This outcome was not pre-specified, but is included to assess whether treatment shifted evaluations from overall negative
to overall positive.
19We also pre-specified a count measure of swing voters, adapting the measure of Weghorst and Lindberg (2013). Because
many respondents had missingness in their voting history – usually because of their age – the count measure is not applicable
to our full sample. None of the main results change if we use the count measure.
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A potential concern with generalizability is that partisans in Central may be different from par-
tisans elsewhere, especially those in non-competitive regions. We note that while our sample contains a
significant number of swing voters, it also contains a large proportion of very “strong partisans”: those
who evaluate their party with the maximum score and opponent parties with the minimum score on the
partisan feeling thermometer. About 42 percent of the sample is a strong partisan by this definition. The
results are robust and stronger in analyses that only contain strong partisans — the types of partisans
that may be present in greater numbers in other regions of the country. In short, while our experimental
sample is confined to the Central region — which we selected to ensure that we had the statistical power
to assess our hypotheses on voter types — the results are likely to generalize to other areas of the country.
4.4 Model Specification
We created a dataset in which the unit of analysis is the participant–candidate dyad. Our baseline speci-
fications are as follows:
Yi jk = α+β0 ∗Ti j + γ j +θXi j + εi jk (1)
and
Yi jk = α+β1 ∗T 1i j +β2 ∗T 2i j +β3 ∗T 3i j +β4 ∗T 4i j + γ j +θXi j + εi jk (2)
Yi jk is an outcome for participant i in electoral area j for candidate k. In Equation 1, we estimate
the causal effect (β0) of receiving any of the debate treatments (Ti j). In Equation 2, we separate by
each treatment condition. γ j are fixed effects for each EA (our sampling units). These ensure that our
inferences are driven by differences between voters who have the same candidate choices (and view
the same debates), and should increase the efficiency of our estimates by controlling for differences
across constituencies and local communities. As pre-specified and to improve precision (Gerber and
Green, 2012), we also include the following pre-treatment covariates (X): age, gender, education, and
employment status. Since participants enter into the data multiple times, we cluster standard errors on
participants. To account for multiple comparisons, in Appendix F (pg. 12-15) we present adjusted p-
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values, which control for the False Discovery Rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). The main results
are robust to these adjustments.
5 Results
5.1 Average Treatment Effects in the Full Sample
Panel A of Table 3 presents the mean evaluation of candidates in each of the five experimental conditions.
The mean in the control group is 3.38, and this increases to 3.59 in the pooled treatment group. The
mean in each treatment group is also higher than in the control group: 3.56 for the Personal Background
segment, 3.64 in Policy, 3.59 in Full Debate (video), and 3.58 in Full Debate (audio).20
Table 3 also presents average treatment effects (ATEs), estimated using Equations 1 and 2. Col-
umn 2 presents the average treatment effect pooling across all treatment conditions. Consistent with
H1, debates have a positive and statistically significant effect on voters’ evaluations of candidates. The
magnitude of the coefficient (0.19 on a 7-point scale) is modest: about one-tenth of a standard deviation,
or about a 6 percent increase from the control group mean.
Table 3 about here
Panel B of Table 3 displays the results using the binary positive evaluation measure. In the con-
trol group, 30 percent of candidates are rated positively. The average treatment effect pooling across all
treatment conditions is 4.5 percentage points. This effect represents a 15 percent increase in the prob-
ability of a respondent positively evaluating a candidate, a substantively meaningful effect that further
corroborates H1.
Appendix Figure J.1 shows the effect of the debates on evaluations for each candidate separately
(pg. 20). We find positive effects for 12 of the 13 candidates. In the full sample, respondents’ evaluations
of candidates from the CPP and the PPP increased the most after watching the debates.21 In summary,
in the full sample, debates lead to modest improvements in respondents’ evaluations of all candidates,
especially those from minor political parties (see Appendix M, pg. 28).
20 The inclusion of the vote intention outcome in Tables 3 and 4 would not be informative because these analyses pool
across all voter-candidate dyads. The vote intention outcome is only meaningful when we examine whether debates make
voters more likely to support specific types of candidates.
21Appendix Table J.1 presents the results aggregated at the party level. The treatment effects for each party on a 7-point
scale are as follows: 0.08 (NDC), 0.06 (NPP), 0.33 (CPP), 0.27 (PPP), and 0.06 (PNC).
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To investigate the mechanisms that drive the pooled average treatment effect in the full sample,
we compare the effect of the policy treatment to the effect of the personal background treatment. Because
participants are randomly assigned to these conditions and participants in the personal background con-
dition do not receive information about policy, this comparison provides a causal estimate of the relative
importance of these potential mechanisms. The results are presented in columns 3-4 of Table 3. While
each treatment has a positive and statistically significant effect, the magnitude of the policy segment ef-
fect (0.23) is larger than that of the personal background segment (0.16), which suggests that information
about policy was more influential. However, the background and policy coefficients are not statistically
different from one another, which suggests that both policy discussions and information about candidate
quality drive the average effects.
To distinguish the effect of visual communication from the information contained in what candi-
dates say, we compare the effect of the Full Debate Video treatment to the Full Debate Audio treatment
(H3). There are no significant differences between the effects of these two conditions. This suggests that
visual information is not driving the treatment effects.
5.2 Results by Partisanship
Table 4 disaggregates the sample between partisans and swing voters. Columns 1 and 2 show that the
debates had no impact on swing voters. By contrast, the debates had a positive and significant impact on
partisans (columns 3 and 4). Thus, the effects that we identify above are driven mainly by the impact of
debates on partisans.
Table 4 about here
Nevertheless, we hypothesized that debates would lead swing voters to support candidates who
performed well in the debates (H5). If swing voters reward good performers and punish poor performers,
this would explain the small average effect in Table 4. Yet further analysis shows that swing voters are
also no more likely to support the debate winner (see Appendix Table H.2, pg. 18).22
Regarding partisans, we hypothesized that debates would further increase their support for co-
partisan candidates. To test this hypothesis, Panel A of Table 5 presents treatment effects among all
22We code the debate winners using both an expert survey and the survey of study participants. See Appendix H (pg. 18).
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partisans. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for overall evaluations. The coefficient in row 1 is the
treatment effect on evaluations of the co-partisan candidate, while the coefficient on the interaction term
(row 2) shows how the effect changes when partisans evaluate opponents. To calculate the marginal
effect on evaluations of opponent-party candidates, we add the coefficient in row 1 to the interaction
coefficient in row 2. Contrary to our expectations, the debates did not affect partisans’ evaluations of
their co-partisan candidate.
Instead, we find a positive and significant effect on partisans’ evaluations of opponent candidates.
Using the results in column 1, we estimate that the debates increased partisans’ evaluations of candidates
from other parties by about 14 percent. In column 2, we restrict the sample to NDC and NPP candidates
to assess whether this moderation effect is driven by changes in evaluations of minor party candidates, or
whether NPP (NDC) partisans are becoming more favorable toward NDC (NPP) candidates. The mag-
nitude of the effect remains positive but decreases in magnitude. While the coefficient is less precisely
estimated because of the decreased sample size (p=0.19), the results suggest that the moderation effect
is not driven entirely by minor party candidates. In Appendix Table K.2 we show that the debates made
partisans 8 percentage points more likely to have a positive evaluation (defined above) of the candidate
from the competing major party (pg. 25). This provides further evidence that partisan moderation is not
driven entirely by partisans’ evaluations of minor party candidates.
Table 5 about here
Panel A of Table 5 also shows that the treatment also significantly influenced the intended vote
choice of partisans: debates made partisans 6 percentage points less likely to say they will vote for their
party’s candidate (column 3, row 1). In addition, partisans become about 2 percentage points more likely
to report an intention to vote for another party.23 Given that national and legislative races are often
decided by one or two percentage points, these effects are substantively large. Indeed, in 2016, about 17
percent of electoral constituencies had a margin of victory of less than 5 percent.
To show that these results are not being driven by the more moderate partisans in the sample,
we further restrict our sample to strong partisans (see above for coding). Panel B of Table 5 shows that
the moderation results remain the same or even larger among these strong partisans. Notably, column
23The estimate represents the marginal effect of treatment on partisans’ preferences for the opponent candidates.
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2 shows that strong partisans of the NDC/NPP become significantly more supportive of the candidate
from the other major party,24 while column 4 shows that they are about 2.5 percentage points more
likely to intend to vote for the candidate from the other major party, a marginal effect that is statistically
significant.25 The debates also made strong partisans 7 percentage points more likely to have a positive
evaluation of the candidate from the other major party, a 54 percent increase (Appendix Table K.2, pg.
25).
Finally, to examine whether the moderation effects are driven by supporters of only one of
Ghana’s two major parties, in Appendices J.3 and J.4 we disaggregate the results by partisanship and
candidate party. When examining all partisan voters, NDC partisans become significantly more favor-
able toward CPP candidates, while NPP partisans become more favorable toward NDC, CPP, and PPP
candidates. This suggests that only NPP supporters moderate their attitudes toward the other major party,
while partisans of both parties become more favorable toward minor party candidates. However, when
we analyze the strong partisans, we find that both NPP and NDC supporters become more favorable
toward the other major party candidate. Thus, we observe moderation toward the competing major party
candidate among strong partisans of both major parties.
In summary, we find that partisanship conditions the effect of debates, although not in the way
that we predicted. Debates make partisans both more favorable and more likely to vote for candidates
from opposing parties, and less likely to vote for their co-partisan candidate.26
5.3 What Drives Partisan Moderation?
To investigate the drivers of partisan moderation, we first draw on our experimental design to estimate
the effect of the personal background segment and the policy segment on partisan moderation. We
restrict our analysis to include only partisans evaluating candidates from other parties. Table 6 reports the
results. In column 1, the personal background and policy coefficients are both positive and significant.
24The marginal effect on evaluations is 0.39 and statistically significant.
25One potential concern with Table 5 is that partisans already have extremely high evaluations of their co-partisan candidate.
However, while co-partisans’ evaluations in the control group are high (a mean of 6.15), and the majority of partisans in
control say they will vote for their co-partisan candidate (86 percent), both of these control group means have the potential to
increase post-treatment. These levels of baseline support mitigate concerns of possible ceiling effects.
26 Appendix Table D.3 examines whether partisan and swing voters differ on pre-treatment variables such as education,
wealth, and age (pg. 9). We find no substantively important differences between these types of voters.
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The coefficient for the policy treatment is larger in magnitude, but is not statistically different from
the personal background treatment coefficient (0.45 versus 0.34). Thus, information on both candidate
qualities and policy lead to increases in partisans’ evaluations of opponent-party candidates.
Column 2 again restricts the analysis to strong partisans.27 Here, the personal background and
policy coefficients are both positive and significant, but the policy coefficient is more than twice as large
in magnitude (0.50 versus 0.22). The magnitude of the policy coefficient is also substantively mean-
ingful: a half a point increase on a 7-point scale. Furthermore, the policy coefficient is significantly
larger than the personal background coefficient (p = 0.008). Thus, for the strongest partisans in the sam-
ple, the policy mechanism plays a larger role in shaping their evaluations of opponent-party candidates.
These results highlight the potential for policy-centered debate to reduce partisan polarization in a new
democracy.
Columns 3 and 4 present the results on intended vote choice. Among all partisans (column
3), none of the treatments increased the likelihood that they would vote for an opposition candidate.
However, information about policy positions increases the share of strong partisans who intend to vote
for opponent candidates by 3 percentage points – a roughly 30 percent increase over the control group
mean (column 4). By contrast, information on candidates’ personal background has no effect on vote
intentions.28
Appendix Table K.3 presents the results using the binary positive evaluation measure (pg. 26).
Again, the policy treatment has a larger effect than the background treatment. For the strong partisans,
the policy segments increase the probability of positively rating candidates from other parties by 10
percentage points, a 50 percent increase. By contrast, the effect of the background segment is a 3-
percentage point increase, a marginal effect that is statistically significantly lower than the marginal
effect of the policy segment. In summary, the experimental evidence shows that policy-centered debate
played an important role in driving partisan moderation. These results are consistent with the theoretical
argument that some partisans update their beliefs based on the new information about competitors that
they were exposed to and are willing to shed their partisan leanings to support alternative candidates.
Table 6 about here
27This analysis was not pre-specified and thus is exploratory.
28These two coefficients are not statistically significantly different, however.
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5.3.1 Examining Partisan Moderation using Real-Time Response Data
We further explore the drivers of partisan moderation by analyzing real-time data capturing voters’ eval-
uations of candidates as they watched one of the debates.29 The respondents in this sample (N=244),
who are separate from the main survey sample, watched the full debate on a tablet using a platform
that records responses in real time.30 Figure 3 displays an image of the platform. Respondents were
instructed to click every time that they either approved or disapproved of what the candidate was saying.
Participants (irrespective of partisanship) were actively engaged in this exercise throughout the debate.31
These data are descriptive and illuminate which elements of the debates provoked a reaction from voters.
Figure 3 about here
We aggregate positive and negative responses for each individual to construct an overall assess-
ment of each candidate during each debate segment. A positive overall score indicates that the respondent
had more positive than negative reactions. We average these scores across NDC and NPP partisans. Fig-
ure 4 displays the results. The y-axis represents the average aggregate response of partisans during each
segment; for example, a value of two shows that partisans had on average two more positive clicks than
they did negative. The left plot displays the reactions of NDC partisans, while the right plot displays the
reactions of NPP partisans.
Figure 4 suggests that partisan moderation occurred mainly during the policy segment. This is
illustrated by trends in the gap between partisans’ evaluations of their co-partisan candidate compared to
the opponent candidate. In the personal background segment, partisans are quite polarized: their reac-
tions are very positive toward their co-partisan and very negative toward the opposing party candidate.
In the policy segments, this partisan gap decreases substantially.32
Figure 4 about here
The real-time response data also allow us to examine which statements provoked particularly
positive or negative responses from participants. In the personal background segment, NDC partisans
29We use the debate from the Effutu constituency. To collect these data, we partnered with G2 Analytics.
30These data were collected at the same time as the larger survey and in the same three constituencies.
31With roughly 35 unique respondents, on average, clicking during any particular 30-second interval of the 40-minute
debate. See Appendix Figures O.1 and O.2 (pgs. 30-31).
32In the personal background section, the average net positive clicks to co-partisans is 3 compared to a 1.5 net negative
clicks for opponents; a difference of 4.5. In comparison, in the education section, this difference is 1.5, and in the employment
section it is 1. The corresponding figure for NPP partisans is a difference of 4 in the background section, and 1.75 and 1.5 in
the two policy segments.
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responded very negatively when the NPP candidate discussed, rather immodestly, his sacrifice to the
community when he became an MP instead of pursuing a career in the United Nations. Similarly, NPP
partisans reacted negatively when the NDC candidate praised President John Mahama and rallied the
crowd for a “one touch” (first-round) NDC win in the presidential election.
In the policy segments, partisans tempered their attitudes toward candidates from the other major
party. For example, the NPP candidate’s employment policies proved popular with NDC partisans.
Similarly, the NPP candidate’s proposal to encourage young entrepreneurs to set up businesses and bid
for government contracts, and to boost the constituency’s renowned but faltering theater arts and choral
music industry, gained support from NDC partisans.
In sum, respondents seemed better able to assess candidates on the merit of their proposals when
watching the policy segments.
6 Do the Effects of Debates Persist?
Finally, we assess whether the effects of debates persist over time. To do so, we conducted a follow-up
survey with a random 10 percent of respondents from our original sample. This survey was conducted
two days later by the same survey enumerator.33
Using this sub-sample, we first replicate the main results and find that the moderation effect is
larger in magnitude in this sub-sample (see Appendix Table P.2). However, in the full sub-sample, the
moderation effect dissipates after two days. Thus, while debates make partisan voters more positive
toward candidates from competing parties immediately after a debate, on average, these effects diminish
quickly. Further analysis reveals, however, that this decay is not universal but rather confined to voters
who live in politically homogeneous communities.
To demonstrate this, we separate the sub-sample between those living in EAs we classified as
competitive versus party strongholds.34 Figure 5 displays the results.35 The left panel displays the
moderation effect immediately after the debates in both competitive and party stronghold EAs. The
33Participants for the follow-up survey were selected using a random number generator in the survey program. Appendix
Table P.1 presents descriptive information about this sample, which was balanced between the treatment and control groups
(pg. 32).
34See Appendix C (pg. 6). This exploratory analysis was not pre-specified.
35These results correspond to Columns 5 and 6 of Appendix Table P.2 (pg. 32).
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right panel shows the same results two days later. The moderation effect persists, and actually increases,
on average, for partisan voters living in electorally competitive EAs, while it is short-lived in party
strongholds. In short, the durability of debates’ influence appears to be conditioned by where voters
live, a finding that we discuss further in the next section. We also note that two days is a relatively
short period of time. Therefore, it remains an empirical question how long the effects will persist in
competitive areas.36
Figure 5 about here
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Using an experimental research design and unique observational data, we investigate whether and why
candidate debates influence voters’ attitudes toward parliamentary candidates in Ghana. Our most impor-
tant results are that debates moderated the political attitudes of partisans, making them more favorable
toward candidates from other parties and less likely to want to vote for co-partisan candidates from their
party. We also show that the policy-centered components of the debates are important drivers of partisan
moderation.
These results make several novel contributions and suggest several important areas of future re-
search. First, the partisan moderation result contrasts with some of the literature on debates and political
communication in the United States (Levendusky, 2013). We suggest that there are two related expla-
nations for this moderation effect. First, because information is most likely to have an impact when
it differs from what voters already believe, debates are most likely to provide new information that is
positive about opponent party candidates and negative about co-partisans (relative to priors). Second, we
suggest that the nature of partisan attachments in new democracies is such that voters are less inclined to
engage in partisan motivated reasoning, which makes them more open to arguments about policy from
opponent party candidates. Better understanding why debates moderate attitudes in new democracies,
as well as in electoral authoritarian regimes (Platas and Raffler, 2018), is an important area for future
research.
36 We also analyze the fifteen percent of the sample who had been exposed to the debates before entering the study. The
results (Appendix G, pg. 16) show that treatment did not have an effect on these voters. This null effect could suggest
persistence of the effect of the original debate on this sub-sample.
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Second, our findings on partisan moderation contrast with recent research that has found evi-
dence of ethnic and partisan motivated reasoning in African contexts (Adida et al., 2017; Carlson, 2016;
Horowitz and Long, 2016). Thus, it will also be important for future research to examine how the type
of information and the mode of dissemination shapes the influence of political information on voter atti-
tudes. Our evidence shows that the debate format, where voters hear directly from candidates and watch
them engage with one another, encourages partisans to be more open to candidates from other parties.
Future research could directly compare debates to other candidate-centered events, such as town hall
meetings and rallies, and information from the news media or civil society campaigns.
Third, we find that partisan moderation is mainly driven by policy debate, especially for strong
partisans. This result suggests that debates can play a role in increasing policy-based campaigning in
new democracies. While parliamentary aspirants did engage in valence discourse, the format of the
debates encouraged them to highlight the specific actions they planned to take to improve the livelihoods
of constituents. The real time data suggests that voters are responsive to this type of localized policy
information. Future research could more explicitly test the relative impact of valence versus policy-
specific appeals in the context of candidate-centered events.
Finally, we find that, on average, debates’ influence on voters does not persist, a finding that is
consistent with studies on campaign advertising in the United States (Gerber et al., 2011; Hill et al.,
2013). However, these results also demonstrate that the longer-run impact of campaign events can be
conditional on the political environment in which voters live. Indeed the moderation effect persisted
in electorally competitive communities, while it dissipated in non-competitive areas. There may be
multiple explanations for this result. Those living in competitive communities may be exposed to (or
select into) more diverse media and points of view, which could reinforce the influence of debates. In
contrast, those in party stronghold communities may only be exposed to highly partisan information
or to social pressure to support the dominant party, which could overtake the information absorbed in
the debates. Alternatively, political parties may be able to respond more effectively to counteract the
influence of debates in communities where they are electorally dominant (Arias et al., 2018; Humphreys
and Weinstein, 2013). Future research should investigate the potential drivers of these contextual effects
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more directly. Such research will be important for determining the conditions under which debates have
a durable influence on voters.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Names and party affiliations of parliamentary candidates in the debates
Party Constituency
Effutu KEEA Mfantseman
NDC Eric Don-Arthur Samuel Atta Mills* James Essuon
NPP Alexander Afenyoh-Markin* Stephen Nana Ato Arthur Ekow Hayford*
PPP Nana Ofori Owusu John Sterlin Kwabena Amu Quandoh Okyere
CPP Ebenezer Rolance Akumbea-Sam Rose Austin Tenadu Pius Ebo Dughan
PNC Murtala Muhammed Umar
Notes: * Denotes the winners of the 2016 election.
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Table 2: Candidates’ position issues during the policy segment
Education Employment
• Construct more schools, and build toilets and • Construct a new harbor at Winneba
libraries in every school • Re-open processing factory at Ampem
• Free education up to age 18 • Re-open factory at Abokrom
• Set up a constituency fund to pay for mock • Re-open poultry factory at Pomadze
examination fees and extra classes
• Organize inter-school quiz competition to
encourage reading
• Institute a constituency-wide Best Teacher Award
• Institute inter-school reading competitions
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Table 3: Average treatment effects (ATE) in full sample across all candidates
Panel A: Overall evaluation (1-7)
Control Any treatment Personal background Policy segment Full debate (video) Full debate (audio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean 3.38 3.59 3.56 3.64 3.59 3.58
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
ATE 0.19*** 0.16** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.18**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Panel B: Positive Evaluation (binary)
Control Any treatment Personal background Policy segment Full debate (video) Full debate (audio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ATE 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Notes: Observations are at the individual-candidate dyad (N = 8,186). The dependent variable in Panel A is on a 1-7 scale
with higher numbers indicating more positive evaluations of candidates. The dependent variable in Panel B is a binary measure
indicating that the evaluation of the candidate is positive (greater than 4 on the 1-7 scale). The analyses in Panel B were not
pre-specified but are included to provide evidence on the substantive importance of the treatment effects. ATEs are estimated
using linear regression including individual-level pre-treatment covariates and sampling area fixed effects (corresponding to
Equations 1 and 2). Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Average Treatment Effects by Partisanship
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Swing Swing Partisans Partisans
Any treatment 0.03 0.26***
(0.12) (0.06)




Full debate (video) 0.13 0.22***
(0.14) (0.07)
Full debate (audio) -0.07 0.28***
(0.14) (0.08)
Constant 3.51*** 3.51*** 3.41*** 3.41***
(0.34) (0.35) (0.20) (0.20)
Observations 2,496 2,496 5,690 5,690
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: All models include individual-level pre-treatment covariates and sampling area fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Treatment effects among NDC and NPP partisans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: All Partisans Evaluation Evaluation Vote Vote
(All) (NDC/NPP) (All) (NDC/NPP)
Any treatment -0.01 -0.00 -0.06* -0.05*
(0.17) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02)
Any treatment x opponent candidate 0.39* 0.26 0.08** 0.05*
(0.20) (0.20) (0.04) (0.03)
Opponent candidate -3.35*** -3.58*** -0.80*** -0.83***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 6.15*** 6.56*** 0.86*** 0.88***
(0.24) (0.22) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 5,690 2,640 5,742 2,632
R-squared 0.37 0.49 0.60 0.64
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL B: Strong Partisans Evaluation Evaluation Vote Vote
(All) (NDC/NPP) (All) (NDC/NPP)
Any treatment -0.17 -0.14 -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02)
Treatment x opponent candidate 0.56*** 0.45** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.16) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02)
Opponent candidate -4.56*** -4.71*** -0.97*** -0.97***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 6.80*** 7.08*** 0.97*** 0.94***
(0.28) (0.29) (0.01) (0.04)
Observations 3,435 1,596 3,532 1,622
R-squared 0.56 0.71 0.83 0.84
Notes: Partisanship is coded in reference to the respondent: that is, opponents candidates are those who are not aligned with
the respondent’s preferred party (pre-treatment). Observations are at the individual-candidate dyad. Columns (1) and (3)
include all candidates. Columns (2) and (4) only include candidates from the NPP and NDC. The evaluation variable is on a
1-7 scale with higher numbers indicating more positive evaluations of candidates. The vote choice variable is dichotomous.
All models include individual-level pre-treatment covariates and sampling area fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by
individual in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Analysis of mechanisms when partisan voters evaluate candidates from other parties.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Evaluation Evaluation Vote Vote
(All partisans) (Strong partisans) (All partisans) (Strong Partisans)
Personal background 0.34*** 0.22** 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Policy 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.00 0.03**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Full debate (video) 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.01 0.02
(0.10) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Full debate (audio) 0.39*** 0.28** 0.01 0.00
(0.11) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 2.78*** 2.76*** 0.04** 0.10***
(0.27) (0.29) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 4,199 3,129 4,291 3,223
R-squared 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.01
Notes: The sample is restricted to include only partisan voters evaluating candidates from other parties.
Observations are at the individual-candidate dyad. All models include individual-level pre-treatment covariates
and sampling area fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Notes: The figure displays a map of Central region with our three study constituencies highlighted in
grey.
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Figure 2: Distribution of participants across treatment conditions
















Notes: Each respondent had a 20 percent chance of being randomized into each of the five treatment conditions.
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Figure 3: Real time response platform
Notes: Photo of G2 Analytics real-time response platform.
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Two days after debate
Notes: Figure 5 displays the treatment effect of debates when partisan voters evaluate candidates from opposing
parties. Results are separated by electorally competitive and party stronghold EAs. The results correspond to the
regression results in Columns 5 and 6 of Appendix Table P.2 (pg. 32).
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